Germany in Europe: Going solo
Since the times of Chancellor Schröder, Germany has been pretending that it is becoming ‘normal’, especially with respect to Europe and foreign policy – this is something that I recently argued in my policy brief: “The new German question: how Europe can get the Germany it needs”. The question, however, is what normalcy means. If you compare Berlin with the ‘normal’ behaviour of other EU countries, it has in recent months and weeks seemed to be becoming ever more ‘abnormal’. It simply does not behave like its fellow European countries on a range of policy issues.
It is not only that Germany has, in the recent past, become an unstable and unreliable partner in the EU, the NATO and UN. There also seems to be a new-found constant in German politics, which is to continue – at a steady pace – down the road towards political isolation. Germany continues to anger its European neighbours. And it seems to continue to act according to national interests, mindful only of domestic policies and issues, at the expense of its relations with its foreign friends and allies. This might not appear to be the case at first glance, considering the Chancellor’s visit to Washington. However, one shouldn’t be blinded by this, and should know to read the subtle hidden demands Obama makes of Merkel.
Relations with the US and the UK have been shaken due to Libya; anti-German sentiments reign in Greece and Portugal due to the austerity measures there; the Franco-German axis, upon which Europe was built, is also being worn down following Libya and Germany’s nuclear exit. On top of that, we have hasty and uncoordinated EHEC alarmism over E.coli, which especially angered Spain due to the false allegations concerning Spanish cucumbers that are causing losses of more than €100 million per week to Spanish farmers.
We all, no doubt, know that Germany’s recent isolation began with its abstention from UN resolution 1973 on intervention in Libya. This caused great damage to Germany’s international relationships, and to its credibility and reliability in the eyes of its allies. One would have thought, therefore, that Germany, would start to back-peddle and make up for its attempt to go solo.
However, after the Chancellor herself generated further animosity among Germany’s southern European friends, with recent remarks that that the Greek have to work longer and take fewer days off, Berlin’s next big attempt to go solo followed shortly after: a legislative proposal by the German government to stage a gradual exit from nuclear power, with the last plant being turned off by 2022. Although I, and the majority of Germans, support the move, this decision has once again led to dissonance in Europe, especially in France, which sources more than 80 per cent of its energy from nuclear plants.
Eric Besson, the French energy minister, has called for an emergency European sitting. The cause of ill-feeling is not the German decision itself but its lack of communication and coordination with its European partners. Above all, the cause for concern is the effect that this decision will have on European energy security and on the future energy prices. German energy production currently acts as a buffer for the energy supply of many EU members at times of peak demand. Consequently, the likelihood of energy shortages in those member states at peak times in midsummer and on cold winter days will rise. France, for example, imported 16.1 terawatt hours from Germany in 2010 and only exported 9.4 terawatt hours.
Berlin’s abandonment of nuclear power will not only entail higher energy prices for Germany but also for its European neighbours. Meanwhile, Germany – and as a consequence Europe – will become more dependent on Russian gas (a topic the ECFR addressed in a past policy brief: “Beyond dependence: how to deal with Russian gas”), with all the political and monetary implications that brings. And there is another potential consequence of Germany’s impending gas deals with Russia: they might add to the impression that Germany is turning its back on Europe and increasingly facing towards China and Russia.
If the European adventure ultimately has something to do with European convergence and reciprocal assimilation, the question is whether in the future everyone in Europe will need to adapt to German behaviour – or whether we can expect some of the adaptability to come from the German side? It is legitimate for Germany to head down its own “Sonderweg” (special path), but some consultation in advance with its European partners would be nice. It is finally time for Germany to realise that what this country does will have a huge effect on the rest of Europe.
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